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QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
FOR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: 
THE NEED FOR A NEW 
DEFINITION OF "DOING 
BUSINESS" BASED ON IN-STATE 
SALES VOLUME 
All states require foreign corporations1 to register with state 
authorities before they may carry on business in the state. 2 
These qualifications3 statutes require that corporations "doing 
business"• in the state must pay licensing fees, report certain 
information, or submit to other forms of regulation. The statu-
tory definition of "doing business,"11 therefore, is important to 
' A corporation doing business in one state though chartered or incorporated in an-
other state is a "foreign" corporation as to the first state. 17 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8290 (1977) (hereinafter FLETCHER). 
• Many states have separate but similar registration requirements for non-profit cor-
porations. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 163a66 (Smith-Hurd 1970). 
• "Qualification" is distinct from "domestication." Qualification refers to the licensing 
or regulation of a foreign corporation without an attempt to change its status. Domesti-
cation is sometimes synonymous with qualification. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 1.201 (West 1951). Domestication, however, sometimes refers to the re-incorporation of 
a foreign corporation which is available as an alternative to qualification. See, e.g., NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 21-20.122 (1943). 
• "Doing Business" is the expression utilized in the statutes of many states. See, e.g., 
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7301 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 1301 (McKinney Supp. 1978-
79). Section 106 of the MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION ACT and other statutes use the 
term "transacting business." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-397 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. 
§. 22-1401(b) (1977). A variety of other expressions are used in qualification statutes: 
"engaging in business," see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10-2-250, § 90(a) (1977); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.199 (1951); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-8-2 (1967); "carrying on 
business," see, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT.§ 174-7.5 (1976); "commencing business," see, e.g., 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.010 (1977); "conducting affairs," see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
1101 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-49 (Supp. 1979). 
Courts are divided over the question of whether the expressions "doing business" and 
"transacting business" are equivalent. Compare General Conference of Free Baptists v. 
Berkey, 156 Cal. 466, 105 P. 411 (1909) and Griffin v. Implement Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 62 N.D. 21, 241 N.W. 75 (1932) (same meaning) with People v. Montreal & B. Cop-
per Co., 40 Misc. 282, 81 N.Y.S. 974 (Sup. Ct. 1903) and S.R. Smythe Co. v. Forth Worth 
Glass & Sand Co., 105 Tex. 8, 142 S.W. 1157 (1912) and Nagle Motors, Inc. v. Volk-
swagen N. Cent. Distrib., Inc., 51 Wis. 2d 413, 187 N.W.2d 374 (1971) (different 
meanings). 
• The issue of the level of contacts necessary to constitute "doing business" for qualifi-
cation purposes should not be confused with the separate questions of the level of con-
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entrepreneurs whose operations affect states other than their 
home state, or who are considering expanding their business to 
other states. Efficient marketing decisions require that the statu-
tory definition of "doing business" be susceptible to easy and 
precise determination. The definitions of "doing business" in 
present statutes, however, make it impossible in many situations 
to decide whether a corporation is "doing business" in a foreign 
state. Imposing qualification requirements under these uncertain 
conditions makes business decisions to expand into other states 
unnecessarily difficult. 
A change in existing model legislation is needed to remedy the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of current law. Part I of this article 
examines the mechanics of the present qualification system, pay-
ing special attention to the problems created by a multiplicity of 
vague state standards. Part II discusses the historical justifica-
tion and purposes of the present system, concluding that only 
the protection function justifies the continued existence of the 
system. Finally, Part III proposes that "doing business" be de-
fined in terms of the annual volume of in-state sales. This solu-
tion would remedy the problems which plague the present sys-
tem while furthering the legitimate protection function of the 
state qualification requirements. 
I. THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
Present state qualification statutes often fail to indicate 
clearly whether a foreign corporation must qualify. The decision 
whether or not to qualify, moreover, involves considerable risk: a 
court may later determine that the corporation in fact con-
ducted business in the state, and thus impose sanctions. 
A. The Mechanics of Qualification: Procedures and Penalties 
Section 106 of the Model Business Corporations Act6 (MBCA) 
provides that a corporation shall not have the right to transact 
business7 in the state until it procures a certificate of authority 
from the Secretary of State. MBCA Section 106 does not define 
tact necessary for either the assertion of personal jurisdiction, or for the imposition of 
taxes by a state. See note 60 and accompanying text infra (qualification and personal 
jurisdiction); note 68 and accompanying text infra (qualification and taxation). , , 
• 2 MODEL BuslNESs CORPORATION ACT § 106, (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1977). 
• See note 4 supra. 
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"transacting business," but does provide a "safe harbor": a non-
exclusive list of business activities which, alone or together, do 
not constitute transacting business in the state. 8 Even in the 
states which have adopted section 1069 , business activities not 
listed in the safe harbor provision present a major source of un-
certainty. Most states, however, have either failed to adopt the 
"safe harbor" section without alteration or decided to omit it 
altogether.10 Thus, the resolution of many qualification cases de-
• The second paragraph of MBCA § 106 states: 
Without excluding other activities which may not constitute transacting business 
in this State, a foreign corporation shall not be considered to be transacting bus-
iness in this State, for the purposes of this Act, by reason of carrying on in this 
State any one or more of the following activities: 
(a) Maintaining or defending any action or suit or any administrative or arbitra-
tion proceeding, or effecting the settlement thereof or the settlement of claims or 
disputes. 
(b) Holding meetings of its directors or shareholders or carrying on other activi-
ties concerning its internal affairs. 
(c) Maintaining bank accounts. 
(d) Maintaining offices or agencies for the transfer, exchange and registration of 
its securities, or appointing and maintaining trustees or depositories with rela-
tion to its securities. 
(e) Effecting sales through independent contractors. 
(0 Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through employees or 
agents or otherwise, where such orders require acceptance, without this State 
before becoming binding contracts. 
(g) Creating evidences of debt, mortgages or liens, on real or personal property. 
(Changed in 1973 to read: Creating as borrower or lender, or acquiring indebted-
ness or mortgages or other security interests in real or personal property.) 
(h) Securing or collecting debts or enforcing any rights in property securing the 
same. 
(i) Transacting any business in interstate commerce. 
(j) Conducting an isolated transaction completed within a period of thirty days 
and not in the course of a number of repeated transactions of a like nature. 
2 MooEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 106, 2d Par. ~ 1 (1971 & Supp. 1977). 
• Among the states with definitions not modeled after MBCA § 106, several employ an 
abbreviated list of activities: ALA. CODE §§ 10-2-250, 10-2-256, 10-2-273 (1977); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 371, 373 (Supp. 1978); D.C. CooE ANN. § 29-933 (1973); KAN. S-iAT. 
ANN.§ 17-7303 (1974); OHIO REV. CooE ANN.§§ 1703.02, 1703.03 (Page 1978); NEv. REV. 
STAT. §§ 80.010, 80.240 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2101 (1973). 
The definitions in the other states employ no list at all: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1201 
(Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-
1-11-1 (Burns Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303-03 (West 1969); N.H. STAT. ANN. 
§ 300:3 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.199 (West 1953); S.D. COMP. LAWS 
ANN.§ 47-8-1 (1967); VA. CooE § 13.1-102.1 (1978); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 17-1-701 (1977). 
10 Statutory definitions modeled after MBCA § 106 include the following: ALASKA 
STAT. § 10.05.600 (1968); AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-106 (West 1956); CAL. CORP. CODE 
ANN. § 2105 (Deering Supp. 1980); COLO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-101 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-397 (West 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.304 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 22-1401 (1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 418-6 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-106 (Supp. 1980); 
lowA CODE ANN. § 496A.103 (West Supp. 1980-81); Kv. REv. STAT. § 271A.520 (Supp. 
1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:302 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, 
§ 1201 (West. 1964 & Supp. 1980); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'Ns CooE ANN. § 7-103 (1980-81); 
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pends upon judicial construction of "doing business" or similar 
phrases. 11 
State qualifications impose upon a business both direct and 
indirect costs. First, foreign corporation laws typically provide 
for a fee to be paid when applying for a certificate of authority 
to do business. In some states, this is a flat "filing fee."u Other 
states impose a "license fee" based upon the amount of the cor-
poration's capital located in the state.18 Second, state qualifica-
tion schemes often impose annual taxes. Some of these assess-
ments are referred to as "license fees" and are generally fixed in 
amount. 14 Others are labeled "franchise taxes"; these assess-
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 3 (Michie/Law Co-op 1977); M1cH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 
(1012) (Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-211 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.570 
(Vernon Supp. 1980); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 35-1-1002 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 21.20,105 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:13-3 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-17-1 
(1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 1301 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
131 (1975 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.655 
(1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2001 (Purdon 1967 Supp. 1980-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-
1.1-117 (1969); S.C. CODE § 33-23-10 (1976); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 48-1101 (1979); TEx. 
Bus. CoRP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.01 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-102 (1973); 
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.32.010 (Supp. 1980-81); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-49 (Supp. 
1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.801 (4) (West Supp. 1980-81). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
17-7301 (1974) (Gives a list of three activities which do constitute "transacting business" 
in addition to a list of activities which do not constitute "transacting business"). 
The categories of business activities enumerated in MBCA § 106 are representative of 
the safe harbor activities established in pre-MBCA judicial and legislative decisions. 2 
MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 106, 2d Par. ,r 2 (2d ed. 1971) (Official Comment to § 106, 
2d Par.). The following states have adopted the entire list of activities in MBCA § 106; 
ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.600 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.304 (West 1977); HAW. REv. 
STAT. § 418-6 (1976); lowA CODE ANN. § 496A.103 (West Supp. 1980); KY. REv. STAT. 
§ 271A.520 (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-20,105 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-1 
(1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-01 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.655 (1977); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 2001 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-1.1-117 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 16-10-102 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.32.010 (1969). 
11 See note 4 supra. See. also CT. CORPORATION SYSTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING 
BUSINESS (1976) (grouping the holdings in the various states by type of business activity 
involved); Barrett, Advising a Corporation "Doing Business" in Other States, 19 PRAC-
TICAL LAw. 85 (April 1973) (dealing with the types of activity to be avoided in order to 
avoid qualification). 
11 See, e.g., MBCA § 128(n); IDAHO CoDE § 30-l-128(k) (Supp. 1980). Although Cali-
fornia imposes a filing fee of $350, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12211 (Deering Supp. 1980), most 
filing fees range between $10 and $100. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-129(3) (1977) 
($50); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-10-104(1)(e)(I) (Supp. 1979) ($100); M1cH. STAT. ANN. § 
21.200(1060)(b) (Supp. 1979) ($10). 
•• See, e.g., MBCA § 131; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.367 (West 1977). License fees typi-
cally are assessed in an amount which is dependent upon the amount of capital em-
ployed in the state. E.g., MBCA § 131; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.367 (West 1977) (number 
of authorized shares); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1210(1) (Supp. 1977) (par value of author-
ized shares). Most fee schedules are regressive. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.367 (West 
1977). Some set a minimum fee, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.708 (1978); others set a maxi-
mum fee, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. 79-3-755 (1972). 
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-405 (Supp. 1980). 
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men ts are sometimes based upon income111 or fixed in amount, 18 
although most are computed upon some measure of the capital 
employed in the state.17 Third, the statutes typically require a 
foreign corporation to furnish certain information in the applica-
tion for a certificate.18 Qualification statutes, therefore, cause 
foreign corporations to incur the costs of complying with report-
ing requirements. Moreover, states commonly require the filing 
of an annual report with the Secretary of State.19 Although these 
costs are not substantial for larger corporations, they are a factor 
to be considered in the decision of whether or not to qualify to 
do business in a state. 
State qualification schemes are enforced primarily by impos-
ing sanctions on corporations who fail to comply. Denial of ac-
cess to the state's court system is one of the most prevalent 
techniques. The statutes of all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia disable nonqualified corporations from bringing suit. 
In forty-eight jurisdictions, an unqualified foreign corporation is 
forbidden to maintain any action in the courts;20 three states 
'" See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1-130 (West Supp 1980). 
11 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.615 (1968). 
17 See, e.g., MBCA § 133 (stated capital); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-2401 (Supp. 1979) (net 
worth). 
•• See, e.g., MBCA § 110. 
10 See, e.g., MBCA § 125. 
ao MBCA § 124 states that "[n]o foreign corporation transacting business in this State 
without a certificate of authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, suit or pro-
ceeding in any court of this State, until such corporation shall have obtained a certificate 
of authority." 2 MooEL Bus. CoRP. Ac:r ANN. 2d § 124, 11 1 (1971). States which forbid a 
violating corporation to bring any action include: ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.690 (1968); AR1z. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (West 1956); CAL. CoRP. CooE ANN. § 2203 (Deering 1947); 
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-9-103 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (Supp. 1979); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 383 (Supp. 1978); D.C. Coo ANN. § 29-934f (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 607.354 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CooE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); HAw. REv. STAT. § 
418-13 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-124 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE § 23-1-11-14 (Supp. 1979); lowA CooE ANN. § 
496A.120 (West Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7307 (1974); Kv. REv. STAT. § 
271A.610 (Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:314 (West Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1214 (1964); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'Ns. CooE ANN.§ 7-301 (1975); MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 181, § 9 (Michie/Law Co-op 1977); M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.2051 (1974); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.20 (West 1969); Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-247 (1972); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 351.635 (Vernon Supp. 1979); MoNT. CooES ANN. § 15-22-117 (1967); NEB. REv. 
STAT. § 21-20,121 (1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 80.210 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 300:8 
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-13-11 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978); 
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1312 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975); N.D. 
CENT. CooE § 10-22-19 (1976); OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1951); Oa. REv. STAT. § 57.745 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
2014 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-117 (1970); S.C. CooE § 33-23-150 (1977); 
S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-8-30 (1967); TENN. CooE ANN. § 48-1106 (1979); TEx. 
Bus. CoRP. Ac:r. ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CooE ANN. § 16-10-120 (1973); VA. 
CODE§ 13.1-119 (1978); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 23A.32.190 (1969); w. VA. CODE§ 31-1-
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forbid the corporation to bring actions to enforce contracts.11 
The disability to sue extends to suits brought in the federal 
courts,22 and usually extends to successors and assignees of the 
unqualified corporation.18 Subsequent qualification may cure the 
66 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.847 (West. Supp. 1980); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §17-1-719 
(1977). 
11 ALA. CODE § 10-2-254 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11, § 2120 (1973). 
11 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). But see Walker, Foreign Cor-
poration Laws: Re-examining Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. and Reopening the Fed-
eral Courts, 48 N.C. L. REv. 56 (1969). 
There is, however, no disability to sue where jurisdiction is based upon the existence of 
a federal question. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 
439 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); American Export Lines, 
Inc. v. J & J Distrib. Co., 452 F. Supp. 1160 (D.N.J. 1978). 
•• MBCA § 124 extends the disability to "any successor or assignee" of the unqualified 
corporation. 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 2d § 124, 11 1 (1971). The following states 
extend the disability to the same or similar persons: ALA. ConE § 10-2-254 (1975) (per-
sons claiming through or under the contract); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.690 (1968); AR1z. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (West 1956); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (West Supp. 
1979); D.C. ConE ANN. § 29-934f (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.354 (West 1977); GA. 
ConE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); IDAHO ConE § 30-1-124 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 
§ 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); low A ConE ANN. § 496A.120 (West Supp. 1979); Kv. 
REv. STAT. § 271A.610 (Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 1214 (West 1964) 
(no disability for subrogees); Mn. CoRP. & Ass'Ns ConE ANN. § 7-301 (1975) (any person 
claiming under the contract); M1cH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (1051) (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 303.20 (West 1969) (holder in due course doctrine not altered); Miss. ConE ANN. § 79-
3-247 (1972);.MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 35-1-1004 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-20,121 
(1943); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-13-ll (West 1969) (holder in due course doctrine not al-
tered); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1312 (McKinney 
1963) (any successor in interest); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975); N.D. CENT. ConE § 10-
22-19 (1976); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1951); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.745 
(1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2014 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 7-1.1-117 (1969); 
S.C. ConE § 33-23-150 (1976) (no disability for subrogees); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 
47-8-30 (1976); TENN. ConE ANN. § 48-1106 (1979); Tux. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 
(Vernon 1956) (holder in due course doctrine not altered); UTAH ConE ANN. § 16-10-120 
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (1973) (assignee and any person claiming under 
such assignee or corporation); WASH REv. ConE ANN. § 23A.32.190 (1976); W. VA. ConE 
§ 31-1-66 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 180.847 (West Supp. 1980); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 17-1-
719 (1977). 
The statutes in the following states provide that the disability does not extend to as-
signees: DEL ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 383 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7307 (1974). 
The statutes in the remaining states do not indicate whether the disability to sue ex-
tends to assignees, leaving the courts to decide the question. 
Courts are divided over whether the prohibition extends to counterclaims. Compare 
Moore v. Northern Homes of Pa., Inc., 80 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Va. 1978) and Levitt Mul-
tihousing Corp. v. District Court, 188 Colo. 360, 534 P.2d 1207 (1975) and Gibraltar 
Const. and Eng'r, Inc. v. State Nat'! Bank of Bethesda, 265 Md. 530, 290 A.2d 789 (1972) 
and Bozzuto's Inc. v. Frank Kantrowitz & Sons, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 146, 283 A.2d 907 
(1971) (disability to sue applies to counterclaims) with Park v. Cannco Contractors, Inc., 
446 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1977) and Aberle Hosiery Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 
337 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1972) and Burley Newspapers, Inc. v. Mist Publishing Co., 414 
P.2d 460 (Id. 1966) (disability to sue does not apply to counterclaims) and State v. Cook 
United, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), modified, 469 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 
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disability to sue: only four states completely bar causes of action 
accruing before qualification. 24 Where qualification does cure the 
disability to sue, the corporation may have to complete the pro-
cedure prior to the commencement of the action in order to 
avoid a dismissal without prejudice;211 in some states, however, 
courts allow corporations to qualify during trial or at any time 
prior to the entry of a final judgment. 26 
The effects of a disability to sue may be severe. In two circum-
stances, the curable denial of access may have the same impact 
as a dismissal of the action with prejudice. First, in states where 
later filing of an action does not relate back to the date of the 
original filing,27 the statute of limitations may run on the corpo-
ration before it qualifies/as Second, if the failure to qualify is not 
raised initially as a defense, the corporation may be barred 
before it ever learns of the need to qualify. Even dismissal with-
out prejudice may have economic costs. Corporate agents will 
weigh the benefits of access to the courts against the costs of 
qualification. The value of the benefits would be the expected 
value of recovery in the instant suit and all future suits to be 
brought in that state.29 If costs outweigh these benefits of quali-
fication, corporate agents would not continue a suit after failure 
1971). The statutory language of two states appears to prohibit an unqualified corpora-
tion from even defending a suit. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.210 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 
180.847 (West Supp. 1980). The courts of both states, however, have held otherwise. See 
Scott v. Day-Bristol Consol. Mining Co., 37 Nev. 299, 142 P. 625 (1914) (bringing suit 
constitutes implied waiver of claim of inability to defend); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 
Wis. 2d 325, 190 N.W.2d 521 (1971) (prohibition is limited to counterclaims) . 
.. See ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 10.2-254 (1975) (contracts are "void," but the foreign corpo-
ration is "estopped from setting up the fact that the contract or agreement was so made 
in violation of law"); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966) (contracts are unenforceable); 
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-247 (1972) (modified version of MBCA § 124); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 11, § 2120 (1973) (contracts are unenforceable). 
Statutory provisions identical to MBCA § 124 would appear to allow subsequent quali-
fication to cure the disability to sue. See note 23 supra. But see Thomas Indus., Inc. v. 
Wells, 403 Mich. 466, 472, 270 N.W.2d 98, 101 (1978) (despite statutory language identi-
cal to MBCA § 124, the disability to sue may not be curable). 
•• See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975). 
11 See, e.g., Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); 
Typh, Inc. v. Typhoon Fence, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Rigid Component 
Sys. v. Nebraska Component Sys., Inc., 202 Neb. 658, 276 N.W.2d 659 (1979); Lawler v. 
Ginochio, 584 P.2d 667 (Nev. 1978); Grow Farms Corp. v. National State Bank, Eliza-
beth, 167 N.J. Super. 102, 400 A.2d 535 (1979). 
17 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions § 224 (1970). 
•• See, e.g., Kitchen v. Himelfarb, 254 A.2d 694 (Md. App. 1969) (six-month statute of 
limitations for filing of mechanics' lien claim ran before re-filing). The likelihood of such 
an occurrence is greater in states where the corporation need not qualify until just before 
the conclusion of the proceedings. 
19 For small corporations with uncertain business in the state, the recovery in future 
suits will be an insignificant benefit. 
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to qualify is raised as a defense. 
Most states also impose financial penalties for failing to qual-
ify. A majority of the states make the corporation liable for all 
fees and franchise taxes which would have been imposed while 
the corporation should have been qualified, as well as penalties 
for failure to pay on time. 8° For a corporation which has been 
doing business for a number of years, payment of such an accu-
mulated amount may be a substantial hardship even if it could 
have paid the fees and taxes on a timely basis. Moreover, a ma-
jority of states81 impose a fine on the offending corporation. 
•• MBCA § 124 provides: 
A foreign corporation which transacts business in the state without a certificate 
of authority shall be liable to this State, for the years or parts thereof during 
which it transacted business in this State without a certificate of authority, in an 
amount equal to all fees and franchise taxes which would have been imposed by 
this Act upon such corporation had it duly applied for and received a certificate 
of authority to transact business in this State as required by this Act and there-
after filed all reports required by this Act, plus all penalties imposed by this Act 
for failure to pay such fees and franchise taxes. The Attorney General shall 
bring proceedings to recover all amounts due thil! State under the provisions of 
this Section. 
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 124. The following states have adopted a similar 
provision: ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.696 (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (West 
1956); CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 2203 (Deering Supp. 1980); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-9-103 
(1973 & Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 383 (1974) (liability only as a condition of using the courts); D.C. CODE ANN. §· 29-
934f (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.354 (Harrison 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1421 (1977); 
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-124 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1980-81); low A CODE ANN. § 496A.120 (Supp. 1980-81); KY. REv. STAT. § 271A.610 (Supp. 
1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:314 (West 1969 & Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13-A, § 1214 (1974); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-247 (1972); MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 15-22-
117 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-20,121 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-17-20 (Supp. 1979); 
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1312 (McKinney 1963) (liability only as a condition of using the 
courts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-22-19 (1976); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (1978) (liability only as a condition of using the courts); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1951); OR. REV. STAT.§ 57.745 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 
7-1.1-117 (1969); s.c. CODE § 33-23-150 (1976); s. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-8-32 
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1106 (1979) (also as a condition of using the courts); Tux. 
Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-10-120 (1953); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (1973); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 23A.32.190 (1969); W. VA. 
CODE § 31-1-66 (1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-719 (1977). 
•• ALA. CODE § 10-2-250 (1975) ($1000); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (Rep!. 1966) (not 
less than $1000); CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 2203 (Deering 1947) ($20 per day), § 2258 
(Deering 1947) (misdemeanor, $500-$1000); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1979) (not 
more than $5000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-412 (West Supp. 1980) ($1000); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378 (1974) ($200-$500 per offense); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-934f (1973) 
(not in excess of $500); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.354 (West 1977) ($500-$1000 per year); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 22-1801 (1977) ($500 per year); HAW. REv. STAT. § 418-10 (Rep!. 1976) ($100 
per 30 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (10% of unpaid 
fees and taxes); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1978) (not more than $10,000); 
KY. REV. STAT. § 271A.610 (Supp. 1980) ($250), § 271A.640 ($100-$1000) (Supp. 1980); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:315 (West 1969) ($25-$500 plus $50 per day; $1000 maximum); 
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These financial penalties, although not significant to many cor-
porations, 32 may severely affect a small business. 33 
Finally, states have adopted a number of additional penalties. 
They include fines or imprisonment of agents, servants, or of-
ficers,3' imposition of personal liability on officers or agents for 
the debts of the corporation,311 denial of the benefit of the stat-
ute of limitation,36 and susceptibility to an injunction forbidding 
the further transaction of business in the state.37 Sanctions im-
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1214 (1974) ($25 per day); Mo. CORP. & Ass'Ns CooE 
ANN.§ 7-302 (1975) ($200); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 9 (Michie/Law Co-op 1977) (not 
more than $500 per offense per year); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (1055) (1974) ($100-
$1000 per month: 5 year maximum; $10,000 maximum); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 303.20 (West 
1969) (not more than $1000, plus $100 per month after assessment and before compli-
ance); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.635 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (not less than $1000); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 80.210 (1979) (not less than $500); N.H. REV. STAT. § 300:7 (1977), § 651:2 (1974) 
(felony; not more than $50,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-13-11 (West 1969) ($200-$1000 
per year; 5 year maximum); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-17-20 (1978) ($200); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 
55-154 (1975) ($500 plus costs); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page 1978) ($250 plus 
15% of unpaid fees and taxes as a condition of using the courts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 1.201 (West 1953) (10% of unpaid fees and taxes); S.C. CooE § 33-23-150 (1977) 
($10 per day); TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1980) ($100-$5000 per 
month); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.24.040, 9.92.020 (1979) (gross misdemeanor; not 
more than $1000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.847 (West Supp. 1979) (50% of unpaid fees and 
taxes); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-719 (1977) ($500). 
•• Fines can be moderate. See State v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., 32 Conn. Supp. 279, 351 
A.2d 879 (1974) ($500); State v. Guy Mobil Home Corp., 149 S.E.2d 913 (S.C. 1966) ($10 
per day for 61 days). 
•• See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 300:7 (1977), § 651:2 (1974) ($50,000); TEx. Bus. CoRP. 
ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (Vernon 1980) ($5000 per month) . 
.. ALA. CODE § 10-2-254 (Rep!. 1981) (misdemeanor; $100-$1000 and/or imprisonment 
in county jail or hard labor for county for not more than 12 months); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 
64-1204 (1980) (misdemeanor; $100-$1000 per day); CAL. CORP. CooE ANN. § 2259 (Deer-
ing 1977) (misdemeanor; $25-$300); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1979) (civil pen-
alty; not more than $1000); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 378 (1974) (fine: $100-$500); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 418-10 (1976) (forfeiture; $100); IND. CooE ANN. § 23-1-11-14 (Burns Supp. 
1978) (Class C infraction); Kv. REV. STAT. § 271A.640 (Supp. 1980) (fine; $100-$1000); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:315 (West 1969) (fine; $25-$500, or 3 days - 4 months imprison-
ment for non-payment); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'Ns CooE ANN. § 7-302 (1975) (misdemeanor; 
not more than $1000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 80.210 (1979) (fine; not less than $500); OHIO 
REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1703.30, 1703.99 (Page 1978) (4th degree misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.201 (West 1953) (misdemeanor; not more than $1000 and/or not more 
than 30 days imprisonment); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.994 (1979) (fine; not more than $200 
and/or not more than 30 days imprisonment); VA. CooE § 13.1-119 (1978) (penalty; $100-
$1000) . 
.. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1216 (Supp. 1979); VA. CooE § 13.1-119 (Supp. 1980). In the 
absence of a statute imposing liability, the courts will not do so. See, e.g., Medley 
Harwoods, Inc. v. Novy, 346 So.2d 1224 (Fla. App. 1977). But see Gilham Advertising 
Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977) (imposing liability). 
"" HAW. REv. STAT. § 418-13 (Supp. 1979); NEv. REv. STAT. § 80.220 (1979). This sanc-
tion may be imposed in the absence of a statutory provision. Weishaar v. Butters Pump 
& Equip. Co., 89 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1939). 
07 ARlz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-124 (1956); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-9-103 (Supp. 1979); 
DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 384 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-11-14 (Burns Supp. 1980); 
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posed on corporate officers for failure to qualify can be unduly 
harsh in relation to the nature of the offense. 88 The injunction 
penalty is also unnecessarily severe because of the possibility 
that a court may permanently enjoin the corporation from en-
gaging in business in the state. 89 
B. The Qualification Quandary 
In spite of the widespread adoption of the MBCA,'0 states 
have developed numerous definitions of "doing business" for 
qualification purposes. Although a majority of the states have a 
statutory definition of "doing business" which is modeled after 
MBCA Section 106, few have adopted the provision without al-
tering the safe harbor list of activities which do not constitute 
"doing business. "0 Where statutes do not contain such a safe 
harbor, or where the business conduct at issue is not listed, the 
courts create further differences in interpreting the words "do-
ing business."'2 Definitions of "doing business," moreover, are 
based upon the type or nature of corporate activities.'8 Inherent 
vagueness plagues such definitions because of the infinite varia-
tions in the nature and types of business activities. Indeed, very 
few foreign corporations carry on identical activities within a 
given state. Since the question of whether a corporation con-
ducts business within a state represents primarily a question of 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7308 (Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1211 (Supp. 
1980); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 181, § 9 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1980); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 300:7 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-12 (West Supp. 1980); S.C. Coos§ 
33-23-120 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2120 (Supp. 1980). 
88 In Arkansas, an officer may be subject to a fine ranging from $100 to $1000 per day. 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1204 (Supp. 1979). 
18 Cf. Wier v. Fairfield Galleries, Inc., 377 A.2d 28 (Del Ch. 1977) (denial of motion to 
dismiss in an action to permanently enjoin a corporation which was engaged in auction 
sales of jewelry). 
•• See note 10 supra. 
" See note 9 supra. 
•• For example, courts treat. differently the purchase and acceptance of merchandise 
within a state. Compare Sunlight Produce Co. v. State, 183 Ark. 64, 35 S.W.2d 342 
(1931) and State v. Pioneer Creamery Co., 211 Mo. App. 116, 245 S.W. 361 (1922) (quali-
fication required) with Stafford-Higgens Indus. Inc. v. Gaystone Fabrics, Inc., 300 F. 
Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Humboldt Foods, Inc. v. Massey, 297 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. 
Miss. 1968) (qualification not required). 
•• MBCA § 106 lists ten types of activities. The nature of business activities controls 
qualification: (1) the activities must constitute some substantial portion of the corpora-
tion's ordinary corporate business; (2) the activities must reflect an intent to carry on its 
business in the state; (3) the activities must reflect a continuity of act and purpose; (4) 
the determination of whether the activities constitute "doing business" does not depend 
upon the success or volume of business; (5) the activities must be actually performed and 
not merely authorized. 17 Fum:HER § 8466 (1977). 
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fact, 44 businesses can draw few firm conclusions from the results 
of such case law. 
Although the definitions of "doing business" are both numer-
ous and unclear, foreign corporations must nevertheless make 
the decision of whether or not to qualify in various states. The 
danger created by the present state of affairs is that penalties 
may be imposed if the corporation makes an erroneous decision 
not to qualify.n A company may find itself suddenly penalized if 
inexperienced counsel assumes that conduct insufficient to be 
considered "doing business" in one state will be similarly insuffi-
cient in another state, even one with identical statutory lan-
guage. This danger becomes even more pronounced when the de-
cision is made without legal counsel.48 
Frequently, the safest and most efficient method available for 
avoiding the risk of sanctions is to register in every state in 
which the corporation is engaged in even the slightest business 
activity. Corporations often employ such "precautionary" quali-
fication.47 Such a move is undertaken when the expense of mak-
ing an accurate determination whether to qualify exceeds the 
costs of registration. The argument, however, that hardship can 
be avoided with precautionary qualification does not justify am-
biguous state business regulation. Such an approach condones 
the existence of a second de facto standard of "doing business." 
This second standard requires less business contact than the 
vague present statutory standard, and thus encourages precau-
tionary qualification at a lower level of commercial activity. As a 
result, businesses using precautionary qualification must bear 
hidden expenses which stem from the inherent ambiguity of the 
statutory standards. 
Consequently, business executives or their attorneys, in decid-
ing whether to qualify their company as a foreign corporation, 
are often in a quandary. They face stiff penalties if they fail to 
qualify and qualification turns out to be required; they want to 
avoid the needless expense of precautionary qualification; and 
they lack standards for making a reasoned decision. One solu-
•• 17 F'I.ECTCHER § 8464 (1977). 
•• Because of the lack of uniformity in the various standards of "doing business," the 
corporation's agent is also in danger of reaching the erroneous conclusion that it is ap-
propriate to rely on a previous decision not to qualify in a different state. 
•• The problem of an inadvertant failure to qualify is more likely to occur with small 
businesses. An attorney who advises a small business not to qualify may give advice 
based upon inadequate research when he knows that his client's resources are limited. 
47 See CT CORPORATION SvsTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING Bus1NESS (1976), at vii. See 
also Babcock, "Doing Business": The Feasibility of a Statutory Definition, 5 Bus. LAW. 
31, 31-32, 40 (1949). 
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tion, of course, might be to improve qualification statutes by ex-
panding their list of approved activities. At present, states have 
made no attempt to expand substantially the statutory list of 
protected activities.48 Expanding the definition's list, however, 
would lessen this statutory vagueness only to a very limited ex-
tent. In order to salvage the qualification regime, therefore, some 
other means must be found for rectifying the vagueness sur-
rounding MBCA Section 106. 
II. THE JUSTIFICATION AND PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT 
SYSTEM 
A. The Doctrine of Conditional Entry as a Historical 
Justification 
Courts assert that a state has the right to exclude arbitrarily, 
or license in any manner, a foreign corporation within its bor-
ders, so long as the corporation is not deprived of any constitu-
tional rights. 49 A state may exercise power to exclude or restrict 
•• Some states with definitions modeled after MBCA § 106 have added a single type of 
activity to the list of ten. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2001 (Purdon Supp. 1979) 
(ownership of real property); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-20,105 (1977) (acting in a fiduciary 
capacity). The draftsmen of MBCA § 106, however, recognized the impossibility of for-
mulating an exhaustive list of activities not requiring qualification. 2 MooEL Bus. CORP. 
ACT ANN. 2d § 106, 2d Par. 11 2 (1971) (Official Comment to § 106, 2d Par.). 
" Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949). Accord, WHYY v. Bor-
ough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968) (per curiam). Under the United States Constitu-
tion, a foreign corporation is protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Southern R.R., v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910). Corporations, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, may not be deprived of liberty or property without due process 
of law. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936)(liberty); Minneapolis & 
St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (property). In addition, the Supreme Court 
has applied the protections of the interstate commerce clause to the licensing or qualifi-
cation of foreign corporations. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 
322 U.S. 202 (1944); Furst & Thomas v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493 (1931); Railway Express 
Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 
U.S. 282 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); Buck Stove & Range 
Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205 (1912); International Textbook Co. v. Lynch, 218 U.S. 664 
(1910) (per curiam); International Textbook Co. v. Peterson, 218 U.S. 664 (1910) (per 
curiam); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 
216 U.S. 56 (1910); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Crutcher 
v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727 (1885). 
Foreign corporations, however, are not entitled to the privileges and immunities of 
citizens under Article IV, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (contrasting corporate "citizenship" for diversity of citizenship 
purposes). 
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regardless of motive.5° Courts have used this position, known as 
the "doctrine of conditional entry," as a central justification for 
qualification statutes.ai Although courts principally use the doc-
trine of conditional entry to justify the exercise of state power to 
regulate, rather than to exclude, foreign corporations,52 the doc--
trine has had ·considerable influence.53 
The doctrine of conditional entry rests on a faulty legal foun-
dation, however, and provides little support for qualification 
statutes. Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle54 provides the basis for the doctrine: "[A] corporation can 
have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty 
by which it is created. It exists only in the contemplation of the 
law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to oper-
ate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no ex-
istence. "aa Taney's statement can be disputed because it rests on 
both an outdated territorial notion of law and an inaccurate con-
cept of a corporation as a fictional creature of law.ae This doc-
trine is an anachronism. State qualification requirements should 
be justified by something more than this traditional legal 
concept. 
· B. The Purposes Served By Qualification Statutes 
Qualification statutes may also be justified by functional con-
siderations. The only purposes . which ought to justify the stat-
utes' existence, however, are those purposes not fulfilled by 
other _statutory schemes. 
1. The jurisdiction function-Most qualification statutes re-
quire the appointment of an agent for the service of process.57 
This requirement reflects the state interest in providing a conve-
00 Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 257 (1906). 
"' See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 37 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) . 
.. A. Conard, Federal Protection of the Free Movement of Corporations in the United 
States (November 17, 1978) ( unpublished report prepared for discussion at the Confer-
ence on Freedom of Interstate Movement in a Federal Community, Bellagio, Italy, July 
16-21, 1979; Copyright, University of Michigan) at 11 (asserts that there are no reported 
cases of unconditional exclusion). 
" See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L. REv. 1, 8-10 
(1968). 
04 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
"Id. at 588 . 
.. See Walker, supra note 53, at 29-30. 
•
1 Statutes typically state that a qualified foreign corporation must appoint a regis-
tered agent, and that it is deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State if it fails to 
do so. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 113, 115. 
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nient forum for its citizens for causes of action arising out of the 
acts of foreign corporations. States, however, do not need quali-
fication statutes to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corporations, 
since modern long-arm statutes typically provide either for 
implied appointment of an agent for service of process in the 
state, 118 or for a method of service of process in the foreign 
state.119 The jurisdiction function, then, is largely superfluous, 
and not a persuasive ground for qualification statutes. 
Arguably, states have an interest in employing the same stan-
dard of "doing business" for qualification and jurisdiction pur-" 
poses. The states, however, have chosen to establish different 
definitions in qualification and long-arm statutes. States often 
require less contact with the state for jurisdiction purposes than 
for qualification. 60 In these states, the qualifying foreign corpo-
ration's appointment of an agent does not extend the jurisdic-
tion of the state beyond that of the long-arm statute. 
Qualification statutes may have one important jurisdictional 
effect: registered foreign corporations may be subjected to suit 
in the state on causes of action arising from activities outside of 
the state. In these situations, jurisdiction could not be obtained 
under most long-arm statutes, which generally require that the 
cause of action arise within the state.61 States are not forbidden 
to assert jurisdiction in causes of action arising outside of the 
state.62 Qualification statutes, however, encourage the expansion 
of jurisdiction without the usual judicial analysis of its desirabil-
ity. 63 The proper inquiry ought to be whether the business done 
in the state is "sufficiently substantial and of such a nature"6" as 
to permit the state to require the corporation to defend a suit. 
The state can provide a forum for its citizens through statutes 
which deal solely with the question of jurisdiction. The state, 
consequently, does not need qualification statutes to extend the 
jurisdiction of its courts to foreign corporations and should pur'" 
sue other means of doing so. 
2. The taxation function-The imposition of franchise taxes 
08 See, e.g., lowA CooE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1980). 
•• See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 16 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) . 
.., See, e.g., Continental Properties, Inc. v. Ullman Co., 436 F. Supp. 538, 541 (E.D. Va. 
1977); Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Nousis, 366 N.E.2d 38, 42-43 (Mass. 1977); Beltone 
Electronics v. Selbst, 58 A.D.2d 560, 560, 396 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (1977); Horton v. Richards, 
594 P.2d 891, 893 n.3 (Utah 1979). 
•• E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) . 
.. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
•• See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account,'47 N.C. L. REV. 733, 
738 (1969) . 
.. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952). 
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is commonly tied to qualification,811 reflecting the state interest 
in taxing foreign corporations which do business in the state. Al-
though the method of computation varies from state to state, 
franchise taxes are essentially taxes upon the "privilege of doing 
business" in a state.88 Most importantly, the reporting require-
ments of these statutes87 provide information to state revenue 
authorities. The information also helps in identifying corpora-
tions and computing assessments for other state taxes. 
These reporting requirements, however, are unnecessary for 
two reasons. One reason is that the usefulness of such informa-
tion in locating corporations is limited: the constitutional level 
of minimum contact required for taxation purposes is less than 
the standard for qualification,88 and enforcement difficulties oc-
cur where contacts are so slight that corporations need not qual-
ify. Another reason is that state tax laws typically impose re-
porting requirements which are independent of qualification 
statutes.89 While the taxation of foreign corporations is a legiti-
mate state interest, a qualification scheme seems unnecessary to 
further it. 
3. The protection-through-information function- Qualifi-
cation statutes provide information for government officials and 
individual citizens through reporting requirements.70 These re-
quirements serve legitimate purposes by allowing the state to (a) 
supervise the corporations in order to protect its citizens; (b) 
subject foreign corporations to inspection to determine their 
condition, standing, and solvency; (c) treat them in the same 
manner as domestic corporations with respect to disclosure of 
information; and (d) provide evidence of their existence.71 Un-
like the other objectives, the states cannot effectively accomplish 
these purposes through other statutory provisions already in 
existence. 
The foundation of the protection function derives from state's 
desire· to protect its citizens from the misconduct of foreign cor-
•• See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra. 
•• The constitutional limitations on the assessment of "franchise" taxes are the same 
as those on other taxes imposed upon interstate commerce. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). 
07 See note 18 and accompanying text supra. 
•• The respective levels of contact actually required for taxation and qualification are 
similar. See, e.g., Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. Sprague, 474 P.2d 201, 203 (Ariz. 
App. 1970). 
•• Walker, supra note 63, at 746-47. 
•• See notes 18-19" supra. 
11 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d §§ 110-112, 11 2 (1971) (Official Comment to §§ 
110-112). 
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porations. A qualification scheme should minimize the number 
of situations in which the state's citizens could be harmed by a 
foreign corporation deemed not to be "doing business" in the 
state. A state legislature, therefore, must weigh against the risk 
of corporate misconduct the value of increased business activity 
which stems from a less regulated commercial environment. In 
MBCA Section 106, the enumerated activities are unlikely to 
cause harm to local citizens and are justifiably excluded. 72 The 
list of activities, however, is far from complete. While a more 
comprehensive statement of safe harbor activities would help, 
such an expansion could never provide a business with the cer-
tainty needed for making qualification decisions. 
Ill. THE PROPER SOLUTION: ESTABLISH A TEST FOR 
"DOING BUSINESS" BASED SOLEL y ON 
IN-STATE SALES VOLUME 
The present system of state qualification requirements is obvi-
ously deficient. These requirements, however, should not be 
abolished73 because they serve one legitimate purpose, as dis-
cussed above: furnishing general information about foreign cor-
porations not subject to any other information disclosure 
scheme. What is needed is a qualification scheme which incorpo-
rates this protection function, but which reduces the amount of 
uncertainty involved in the decision whether or not to qualify. 
Revising the definition of "transacting business" in the second 
paragraph of MBCA Section 10674 would rectify the serious 
problems of the present qualification statutes. The new defini-
tion would provide that a foreign corporation shall be considered 
to be transacting business in a state only if its annual volume of 
sales in the state exceeds a specified amount. Each state would 
determine the minimum level of sales volume under the statute. 
"Sales in the state" should not, however, include sales which do 
not reflect a presence in the state of the corporation. Present 
qualification statutes have identified three categories which 
should be incorporated into the new definition. These sales in-
11 Of the ten activities enumerated in MBCA § 106, however, two appear to be codifi-
cations of constitutional limitations on the application of qualification requirements: See 
MBCA §§ 106(0, 106(i), supra note 8; 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 106, 11 4.05 
(1971) (annotation of cases establishing constitutional limitations on qualification 
requirements). 
11 But see Walker, supra note 53, at 30 (suggesting abolition). 
14 See note 8 and accompanying text supra. 
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elude those effected through (a) independent contractors,711 (b) 
solicitation or procurement of orders which require acceptance 
outside the state before becoming binding contracts,76 or (c) a 
subsidiary corporation incorporated or transacting business in 
the state. 77 
The proposed revision of Section 106 would provide greater 
uniformity among state statutes, reduce the vagueness of busi-
ness regulation, and fulfill the protection-through-information 
requirements of the states. First, the revision would make state 
qualification requirements more uniform. Present qualification 
statutes provide fifty-one different definitions of "doing busi-
ness" which differ in both statutory language and judicial con-
struction. 78 Although the revision represents model legislation 
like the present Section 106, the proposal's simplicity and brev-
ity would greatly increase the likelihood that states would adopt 
the provision without modification. Because the states would be 
able to establish different sales volume figures, the new system 
would not be uniform insofar as the ultimate decision of whether 
to qualify would be the same for a given level of activity. The 
various sales volume figures, however, would not create the same 
type of confusion caused by the present system. Instead, the 
qualification decision in all of the states would be uniform in the 
sense that the inquiry in each case would turn on one readily 
quantifiable factor: the volume of sales in the state. The propo-
sal's simplicity and brevity, therefore, would reduce the neces-
sity for judicial construction, decreasing the possible number of 
differences in state standards arising from varying 
interpretations. 
Second, the revision would clarify the definition of "doing 
business." The various current definitons of "doing buisness" 
are vague.79 The suggested solution is not a futile attempt to 
clarify the inherent vagueness of the present version of MBCA 
Section 106 by expanding the list of exempted business activi-
ties. Rather than defining "doing business" in terms of the type 
or nature of activity, the proposal utilizes a definition capable of 
objective determination. The proposal does not describe conduct 
which does not constitute "doing business"; rather, the propo-
sal's definition avoids the problems of vagueness inherent in a 
70 See MBCA § 106(e), supra note 8. 
•• See MBCA § 106(0, supra note 8. 
77 See CAL. CORP. CooE ANN. § 2105 (Deering Supp. 1980); GA. Coo& ANN. § 22-1401 
(1977); S.C. CooE § 33-23-10 (1976). 
•• See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra. 
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"negative" and nonexclusive definition like MBCA Section 106.80 
Third, the revision satisfies the protection function of qualifi-
cation statutes. 81 The protection function is satisfied if the for-
eign corporations exempted from registration requirements are 
not likely to engage in conduct harmful to the state's citizens. 
Rather than attempting to enumerate all activities which are un-
likely to result in such injury, the suggested solution exempts 
from qualification foreign corporations whose sales in the state 
do not exceed a certain level. In general, as sales volume in-
creases, so does the level of contact with the state's citizens. 
Thus, a legislature can establish the acceptable level of risk of 
harm to its citizens from unqualified foreign corporations. Activ-
ities which create risks of harm unrelated to the level of sales 
volume, such as securities transactions, should be regulated with 
specific legislation directed at the particular activities. 82 
In deciding what volume of sales would constitute "doing bus-
iness," state legislatures would make a judgment as to the point 
at which the level of contact, as reflected in sales figures, war-
rants qualification. The volume of sales, however, also provides a 
rough indication of the size of a corporation's operations in the 
state. Thus, the legislatures could also weigh the benefits which 
flow to its citizenry from the activity of a number of small busi-
ness operations which might not exist if required to qualify. For 
example, a legislature especially concerned about "fly-by-night" 
entrepreneurs, and less concerned about attracting small busi-
nesses to the state, could mandate qualification when annual 
sales in the state exceeded $1000. By contrast, a legislature not 
convinced that unregistered foreign corporations presented a sig-
nificant threat, or more concerned with attracting new busi-
nesses, might require registration only when the annual sales in 
the state exceeded $100,000. In summary, the proposal better 
provides the state legislature with the opportunity to make an 
effective cost-benefit analysis when determining which corpora-
tions should register. 
CONCLUSION 
The present system of state qualification requirements has 
"' See Babcock, supra note 47. The author advocates that "doing business" be defined 
by statute in affirmative and exclusive terms. Id. at 38-39. 
01 See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§§ 1-101 to -704 (Purdon Supp. 1980) (Pennsylvania 
blue sky law). 
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significant weaknesses. A multiplicity of "doing business" defini-
tions exist, coupled with an unacceptable degree of vagueness in 
those definitions. The resulting uncertainty makes most deci-
sions not to qualify in a state risky. As a result, many foreign 
corporations are forced to qualify without regard to whether 
they are actually "doing business." Qualification requirements 
serve the legitimate purpose of gathering the information neces-
sary to protect a state's citizens. The present system, however, 
must be modified in order to correct its deficiencies. 
A change in the MBCA definition of "transacting business" is 
required. The new definition should abandon the previous at-
tempts to define "doing business" in terms of the type or nature 
of the conduct. Instead, the definition should be formulated in 
terms of the volume of sales in a state. This definition would be 
simple and susceptible to objective measurement. It would pro-
vide uniformity and clarity, while allowing qualification schemes 
to serve proper state interests. Without this new definition, the 
very legitimacy of state qualification requirements for foreign 
corporations remains uncertain. 
-Stanley M. Klem 
